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Abstract
The capacity region of a channel consists of all achievable rate vectors. Picking a particular point
in the capacity region is synonymous with rate allocation. The issue of fairness in rate allocation is
addressed in this paper. We review several notions of fairness, including max-min fairness, proportional
fairness and Nash bargaining solution. Their efficiencies for general multiuser channels are discussed.
We apply these ideas to the Gaussian multiple access channel (MAC) and the Gaussian broadcast
channel (BC). We show that in the Gaussian MAC, max-min fairness and proportional fairness coincide.
For both Gaussian MAC and BC, we devise efficient algorithms that locate the fair point in the capacity
region. Some elementary properties of fair rate allocations are proved.
1 Introduction
There are several fairness criteria in rate allocation. The simplest one is to mandate that all users have
the same data rate and maximize this common data rate within the capacity region. This allocation is
equitable and maximize the data rate of the worst user. However, it often does not effectively utilize
system resources.
Another criterion is called max-min fairness. It relaxes equity and allows increasing the rates of some
users without lowering the minimum data rate in the system. Under such an allocation policy, nobody can
be benefited by worsening anybody who has lower data rate. It can be rephrased as follows. If we take
some resources from a wealthy user to a relatively poor user (without reversing the order of wealthiness),
the resulting allocation is considered fairer. Such operation is called a Robinhood operation. We say that
an allocation is max-min fair if no Robinhood operation is possible without violating feasibility.
The max-min fairness is considered quite stringent. Any decrease of rate of a user with low data
rate cannot be compensated by increasing the rate of any user with higher rate, no matter how small the
decrease is. Kelly considers logarithmic utility function and proposes proportional fairness for network flow
control [1]. Roughly speaking, we say that a rate allocation is proportionally fair if any adjustment will
decrease the sum of percentage change over all users. A framework of optimization is thereby introduced
using Lagrangian technique. Both max-min and proportional fairness are popular criteria for flow control
in unicast and multicast networks [2, 3].
Another classical notion of fairness is the Nash bargaining solution coined by Nash in the 50’s [4]. In
fact, proportional fairness is its special case. The Nash bargaining solution is a standard tool in cooperative
game theory, and is applied widely in network resource allocation. For example, see [5] for application to
orthogonal frequency division multiple-access networks.
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Yet there is another fairness criterion based on the theory of majorization. We will give formal defini-
tions of all the above criteria in the next section.
In this paper, the problem of picking a point in the capacity region of Gaussian MAC and BC according
to some fairness criteria is considered. Some works have been done on Gaussian MAC. The sum rate at
the max-min fair allocation is characterized in [6]. The polymatroid structure of the capacity region
of Gaussian MAC is exploited in [7, 8], and algorithms for locating the max-min fair point are found.
Implementation issue is addressed in [9].
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we give precise definitions of fairness, and
review the theory of majorization and Schur-convexity. The results are summarized in Section 3, and the
details for the Gaussian MAC and BC are in Section 4 and 5 respectively. The appendix contains some
proofs of the theorems in Section 4.
2 Fairness, Majorization and Schur-convexity
The set of all users is denoted by Ω = {1, . . . ,K}.
In this section, we review several fairness criteria, and the theory of majorization. We will use the
symbol R to represent capacity region, which is assumed to be a closed and convex set throughput this
section.
An allocation is symmetric if every user has the same data rate. Symmetric capacity is the maximal
sum rate of all symmetric allocations,
Csym(R) := max{Kr : (r, r, . . . , r) ∈ R}.
An allocation is called max-min fair if we cannot increase the rate ri of user i without decreasing rj
for some rj ≤ ri, while maintaining feasibility. At the max-min fair allocation, no user can increase the
data rate without compromising users with lower data rate. Formally speaking, a rate allocation rMM is
max-min fair in R if for any r ∈ R such that rMMi < ri for some i, then we can find j ∈ Ω such that
rj < r
MM
j ≤ r
MM
i . The sum of rate at the max-min fair allocation for capacity region R is called the
max-min capacity and is denoted by CMM (R).
Proportional fair (PF) rate allocation (rPFi )i=1...K is the data rate allocation that maximizes
K∑
i=1
log ri.
The proportional fair capacity is the corresponding sum rate,
CPF (R) :=
K∑
i=1
rPFi .
Since the capacity region R is closed and convex, and the log function is concave, the maximization is
well-defined. Another characterization of the proportional fair allocation rPF is
K∑
i=1
ri − rPFi
rPFi
≤ 0
for all point r in the capacity region R.
In the Nash bargaining solution, there is a notion of disagreement point, which is the default operating
point if the users fail to reach any agreement. User i will not accept any data rate lower than di. The rate
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Figure 1: The point d is the disagreement point. The shaded area is the acceptable rate allocation.
allocated to user i in the Nash bargaining solution should be larger than or equal to di (Fig. 1). If we are
given a disagreement point d in the capacity region, the Nash bargaining solution maximizes
K∑
i=1
log(ri − di)
over all points in the region
{r ∈ R : ri ≥ di ∀i}.
The Nash bargaining solution satisfies several desirable properties. See [10] for details. It is obviously
identical to the proportional fair solution when the origin is chosen as the disagreement point.
For a vector x = (x1, . . . xK) ∈ R
K
+ , we denote the components in nondecreasing order by
x[1] ≤ x[2] ≤ . . . ≤ x[K].
We say that vector x is majorized by vector y, written as x  y, if for k = 1, . . . ,K − 1,
k∑
i=1
x[i] ≥
k∑
i=1
y[i], and
K∑
i=1
x[i] =
K∑
i=1
y[i].
In other words, if we sort the components of x and y in nondecreasing order, the cumulative sum of the
components of x is larger than the corresponding cumulative sum of y.
Majorization induces a partial order that measures dispersion. It is known as the Lorenz order in
economics, and is used for comparing income distributions. When x  y, we say that the distribution
according to x is less spread out, and is thus fairer than that of y. A canonical example is that the vector(
1
K
, . . . ,
1
K
)
is majorized by any vector in RK+ whose components sum to 1.
A function f : RK+ → R is called Schur convex if
f(x) ≤ f(y),whenever x  y.
If the inequality above is reversed, then we say that the function f is Schur concave. A class of Schur-convex
functions is constructed using the following lemma.
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Lemma 1. If θ : R→ R is convex (concave), then the function
f(x) =
K∑
i=1
θ(xi)
is Schur-convex (Schur-concave).
A useful criterion for Schur-convexity is as follows.
Lemma 2 (Schur’s criterion). Suppose that F : RK+ → R is differentiable and symmetric, meaning that
F (x1, . . . , xK) = F (xπ(1), . . . , xπ(K)) for any x and permutation π of {1, . . . ,K}. Then
1. F is Schur-convex if (xi − xj)
(
∂F
∂xi
(x)− ∂F
∂xj
(x)
)
≥ 0 for all i and j,
2. F is Schur-concave if (xi − xj)
(
∂F
∂xi
(x)− ∂F
∂xj
(x)
)
≤ 0 for all i and j.
See [11] for more on the theory of majorization and Schur-convexity.
3 Capacity-Fairness Tradeoff
Usually there is a tradeoff between sum rate and fairness. The next theorem illustrates such a tradeoff.
It shows that the requirement of symmetric fairness is more stringent than proportional fairness in the
sense that the symmetric capacity is always less than or equal to the proportional-fair capacity. We use
the notation Csum for the sum capacity, defined as
Csum(R) = max
(r1,...,rK)∈R
K∑
i=1
ri.
Theorem 3. For any convex region R,
Csym(R) ≤ CPF (R) ≤ Csum(R),
Csym(R) ≤ CMM (R) ≤ Csum(R).
Equality holds in the first inequality in the first line only if the PF allocation is symmetric.
Proof. All inequalities are obvious except the the first inequality in the first line, i.e., Csym(R) ≤ CPF (R).
Let (r0, . . . , r0) be the maximal symmetric rate allocation, and (r
PF
1 , . . . , r
PF
K ) be the proportional fair
rate allocation in region R. We have
rK0 ≤
K∏
i=1
rPFi ≤
( 1
K
K∑
i=1
rPFi
)K
.
The first inequality comes from the defining property of proportional fairness, and the second is the
AM-GM inequality. Thus,
r0K ≤
K∑
i=1
rPFi .
When equality holds, then we must have rPF1 = r
PF
2 = . . . = r
PF
K . This proves the first inequality.
In general, the max-min capacity may or may not be larger than the proportional fair capacity. How-
ever, in Gaussian MAC, both max-min and proportional fair capacity achieve the sum capacity. In fact,
the max-min fair and proportional fair rate allocation in Gaussian MAC coincide. It is hence not necessary
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Symmetric Max-min and PF Max. sum rate
η [0,1] 1 1
C∗ is Schur concave in P Theorem 8 trivial trivial
P1 ≤ . . . ≤ PK ⇒ r
∗
1 ≤ . . . ≤ r
∗
K trivial Theorem 15 N/A
P  P˜⇒ r∗  r˜∗ N/A Corollary 17 N/A
Table 1: (Summary of results for Gaussian MAC) Capacities as a function of the power constraint vector
P are Schur concave. For max-min fair or proportional fair, the rates are in increasing order if the power
constraints are sorted in increasing order. If the power constraints are more spread out, so does the
associated rate allocation.
Symmetric and Max-min PF Max. sum rate
η [0,1] [1/K, 1] 1
C∗ is Schur convex in N Theorem 26 Conjecture 33 trivial
N1 ≤ . . . ≤ NK ⇒ r∗1 ≥ . . . ≥ r
∗
K trivial Corollary 30 trivial
N1 ≤ . . . ≤ NK ⇒ p∗1 ≤ . . . ≤ p
∗
K Theorem 25 Theorem 32 false
Table 2: (Summary of results for Gaussian BC) Capacities as a function of the noise vector N are Schur
convex. When the noise powers are sorted in increasing order, then the data rates are in decreasing order,
and the power are in increasing order.
to distinguish between max-min and proportional fairness in Gaussian MAC. Meanwhile, in Gaussian BC,
max-min capacity is the same as symmetric capacity.
Given a rate allocation r, we define its efficiency, η, as the ratio between the sum rate at r and the
maximal sum capacity. Obviously, this is a number between zero and one. For proportional fairness, we
have the following lower bound on η.
Theorem 4. Let R be a convex region in RK+ , the efficiency for proportional fairness, ηPF , is lower
bounded by 1/K.
Proof. By the definition of proportional fairness, the region R is contained in the polyhedron P defined
by
K∑
i=1
ri
rPFi
≤ K,
and ri ≥ 0 for all i. Therefore, Csum(R) is not larger than Csum(P), which is equal to Kmaxi rPFi . Hence,
ηPF =
CPF (R)
Csum(R)
≥
rPF1 + · · ·+ r
PF
K
Kmaxi rPFi
>
1
K
.
We will show that in Gaussian MAC, ηPF is exactly 1; it achieves the maximal value. In Gaussian
BC, the lower bound 1/K is attained, i.e., inf CPF /Csum = 1/K with the infimum taken over all K-user
Gaussian BC.
The major results are summarized in Table 1 and 2. For both Gaussian MAC and BC, we also devise
efficient algorithms that compute the fair solutions.
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Figure 2: Capacity Region of a 3-user Gaussian MAC channel
4 Multiple-Access channels
In a scalar Gaussian MAC with K users, the received signal is
Y =
K∑
i=1
Xi + Z,
where Xi is zero-mean Guassian with variance at most Pi and Z is Gaussian noise with power N . Let C
denote the Shannon capacity formula
C(x) =
1
2
log(1 + x).
The capacity region of a scalar Gaussian MAC is [12]{
R ∈ RK+ :
∑
i∈S
Ri ≤ C
( 1
N
∑
i∈S
Pi
)
, for all S ⊆ Ω
}
The faces of the capacity region are hyper-planes in the form
∑
i∈S Ri = c for some subset S of Ω and
constant c.
In vector Gaussian MAC, the received signal is
Y =
K∑
i=1
Xisi + Z.
The si’s are unit-norm column vectors of length L, Xi is a Gaussian random variable with zero mean and
variance at most Pi, and Z is the Gaussian noise vector with zero mean and covariance matrix NI, where
I is the L× L identity matrix. The capacity region of a vector Gaussian MAC is [13]{
r ∈ RK+ :
∑
i∈S
ri ≤
1
2
log
∣∣∣I+ 1
N
∑
i∈S
Pisis
T
i
∣∣∣ for all S ⊆ Ω}.
A typical capacity region of Gaussian MAC for 3 users is illustrated in Figure 2.
As in [14], we will unify our treatment and present the results for MAC in more general terms. For
any subset S ⊆ Ω and r = (r1, . . . , rK), we use the shorthand notation
r(S) :=
∑
i∈S
ri
for the summation of components of r with indices in S.
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For any function g mapping subsets of Ω to R+, let P(g) denote the polyhedron{
r ∈ RK+ : r(S) ≤ g(S), ∀S ⊆ Ω
}
.
If the function g satisfies (i) g(∅) = 0, (ii) g(S) ≤ g(T ) if S ⊆ T , and (iii) g(S)+g(T ) ≥ g(S∩T )+g(S∪T )
for all subsets S and T of Ω, then g is called a rank function. Property (ii) and (iii) are called the monotonic
and submodular property respectively. We say that the polyhedron P(g) is a polymatroid when g is a rank
function.
The capacity regions of scalar and vector Gaussian MAC are polymatroids. For scalar Gaussian MAC,
we define the rank function as
g(S) =
1
2
log
(
1 +
1
N
∑
i∈S
Pi
)
. (1)
On the vector case, we define the rank function as
g(S) =
1
2
log
∣∣∣I+ 1
N
∑
i∈S
Pisis
T
i
∣∣∣. (2)
The collection of points that achieve equality on total data rate r(Ω) = g(Ω) is called the dominant
face. Given a vector r in P(g), we say that the set S is a bottelneck of r if
r(S) = g(S).
For any function g : 2Ω → R+, if
g(A) ≤ g(B) implies g(A ∪ C) ≤ g(B ∪ C)
whenever A∩C = ∅ = B ∩C and |A| = |B|, then we say that g satisfies the order property. The heuristic
meaning is as follow. If the achievable sum rate of group A is less than or equal to that of group B, then
even if they cooperate with users in group C, the sum rate of group A ∪ C is still less than that of the
group B ∪ C.
Example 1 Consider the function g defined as g({a}) = 1, g({b}) = 2, g({c}) = g({b, c}) = g({a, b}) = 3,
g({a, c}) = g({a, b, c}) = 4. We have g({a}) < g({b}) but g({a, c}) > g({b, c}). This function does not
satisfy the order property.
The scalar Gaussian MAC satisfies the order property, but the vector Gaussian MAC in general does
not.
In both the scalar and vector Gaussian MAC, there is a canonical choice of disagreement point for the
Nash bargaining solution. Each user can treat the signal of the others as noise and decode independently.
For scalar Gaussian MAC, the resulting data rate for user i is
C
( Pi
N +
∑
j 6=i Pj
)
.
In the vector case, if user i uses linear MMSE receiver with no joint processing with others, the data rate
is [15]
C
( 1
N
Pis
T
i M
−1
i si
)
,
where Mi is the matrix
I+
1
N
∑
j 6=i
Pjs
T
j sj .
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In both cases, they can be expressed in terms of the rank function as
d∗i := g(Ω)− g(Ω \ {i}). (3)
The rate vector d∗ = (d∗1, . . . , d
∗
K) is called the canonical disagreement point.
The next lemma is a useful consequence of the order property. The proof is straightforward and is
omitted.
Lemma 5. Let g : 2Ω → R+ be a function that satisfies the order property.
1. If g({1}) ≤ g({2}) ≤ . . . ≤ g({K}) are in nondecreasing order, then g({1, 2, . . . , i}) ≤ g(S) for all
S ⊆ Ω of size i.
2. For any subset A, the function g′(S) = g(S ∪A)− g(A) defined for S ⊆ Ω \A also satisfies the order
property.
4.1 Symmetric Rate Allocation
The computation of the symmetric capacity in P(g) amounts to finding the tightest constraint among
r(S) ≤ g(S) for all subsets S. Each component of the symmetric rate cannot exceed g(S)/|S| for all
S ⊆ Ω. The symmetric rate allocation can be computed by checking 2K − 1 constraints.
If g satisfies the order property, the symmetric capacity can be computed more efficiently using
Lemma 5. The computation requires taking the minimum of only K numbers.
Theorem 6. Let g : 2Ω → R+ be a function that satisfies the order property. By relabeling we can assume
that g({i}) ≤ g({j}) whenever i < j. The symmetric capacity in the polyhedron P(g) equals
K ·min
{ 1
k
g({1, . . . , k}) : k = 1, . . . ,K
}
.
Corollary 7. The infimum of fair efficiency of symmetric fairness, taken over all K-user MAC, is zero.
Proof. Suppose that the power of user 1, P1, is much less than the others, so that
g({1}) = min
{ 1
k
g({1, . . . , k}) : k = 1, . . . ,K
}
.
We see that the symmetric capacity approaches zero when P1 approaches zero, while the maximal sum
approaches a positive constant.
We next compare two MACs with different power constraints. If the power constraints P1, . . . , PK
become more disperse, then the symmetric capacity will decrease.
Theorem 8. Let Csym(P, N) be the symmetric capacity of a scalar Gaussian MAC with power constraints
P and noise power N . If P  P′, then Csym(P, N) ≥ Csym(P′, N), i.e. the symmetric capacity of
multiple-access channel with fixed noise power is a Schur-concave function.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that the power constraints are sorted in nondecreasing order,
P1 ≤ P2 ≤ . . . ≤ PK , and P ′1 ≤ P
′
2 ≤ . . . ≤ P
′
K . Since scalar Gaussian MAC satisfies the order property,
the corresponding symmetric rate allocations rsym and ssym are given by
rsymi = min
{1
k
C
( 1
N
k∑
i=1
Pi
)
: k = 1, . . . ,K
}
and
ssymi = min
{1
k
C
( 1
N
k∑
i=1
P ′i
)
: k = 1, . . . ,K
}
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for all i. As
k∑
i=1
Pi ≥
k∑
i=1
P ′i
for all k, we have
C
( 1
N
k∑
i=1
Pi
)
≥ C
( 1
N
k∑
i=1
P ′i
)
.
Therefore rsymi ≥ s
sym
i .
4.2 Max-min and Proportional Fair Rate Allocation
The following is a useful characterization of max-min fairness [16].
Lemma 9. For any function g : 2Ω → R+, a vector r is max-min fair in the polyhedron P(g) if and only
if for all i, the ith component is largest in some bottleneck. In other words, for i = 1, . . . ,K, i is contained
in a bottleneck B and ri ≥ rj for all j ∈ B.
The proof of Lemma 9 is contained in the Appendix. The next theorem is the main theorem in this
section. The proof of Theorem 10 is in the Appendix (See Prop. 35 and 36.)
Theorem 10. Suppose that g : 2Ω → R+ satisfies the submodular property. The max-min fair point rMM
in P(g) is on the dominant face, and is majorized by every point on the dominant face.
It is noted that in the theorem we do not assume that the function g is a rank function. The result
holds as long as we have the submodular property. The max-min fair allocation is fairer than any other
point on the dominant face in the sense of fairness induced by majorization. The max-min fair solution
also has the following interpretations.
Corollary 11. If g : 2Ω → RK+ satisfies the submodular property, the order property and g(∅) = 0, then
the max-min fair (and hence the proportional fair) solution r∗ maximizes r[1], r[1]+r[2], . . . , and
∑K−1
j=1 r[j]
simultaneously over all points on the dominant face.
Corollary 12. If g satisfies the submodular property, then the max-min point and the proportional fair
point in P(g) coincide.
Proof. Since log is a concave function,
∑
i log(ri) is Schur-concave by Lemma 1. Because the max-min
point rMM is majorized by any point r on the dominant face, we have∑
i
log(rMMi ) ≥
∑
i
log(ri).
Hence rPF = rMM .
Corollary 13. If g satisfies the submodular property, then the max-min (and the proportional fair) point
in P(g) is the point on the dominant face that minimizes the Euclidean norm.
Proof. The function f(x) = x2 is convex. The proof is similar to the proof of the last corollary.
Corollary 14. If g satisfies the submodular property, the fairness efficiency of max-min fairness and
proportional fairness is equal to 1.
Theorem 15. Suppose that g : 2Ω → R+ satisfies both submodular and order property, and assume
g({1}) ≤ g({2}) ≤ . . . ≤ g({K}) after suitable relabeling. Then the components of max-min fair (and
hence the proportional fair) solution r∗ in P(g) are in nondecreasing order, r∗1 ≤ r
∗
2 ≤ . . . ≤ r
∗
K .
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Proof. Consider any i in Ω. The index i is contained in a bottleneck Ai of r
∗ so that r∗i = max{r
∗
j : j ∈ Ai}.
If i− 1 ∈ Ai, then r∗i−1 ≤ r
∗
i . Otherwise, suppose i− 1 6∈ Ai and let S denote Ai \ {i}. Then
r∗(S ∪ {i− 1}) ≤ g(S ∪ {i− 1}) ≤ g(S ∪ {i}) = r∗(S ∪ {i}).
We have used the order property in the second inequality. This implies that r∗i−1 ≤ r
∗
i .
A typical class of functions that satisfies the order property is the generalized symmetric functions. A
rank function g is said to be generalized symmetric if it has the form
g(S) = φ(Q(S)), (4)
where φ is a monotonic increasing and concave function with φ(0) = 0 and Q ∈ RK+ . The rank function
in the scalar MAC is an example of generalized symmetric function.
The next theorem compares two Gaussian MACs, with the same total power but different distribution
in the power constraints. It shows that if the distribution of power constraints is more spread out, so does
the corresponding max-min fair rate allocation. The proof is relegated to the appendix.
Theorem 16. Let g be a generalized symmetric rank function defined as g(S) = φ(P(S)), for some
vector P ∈ RK+ . Let P˜ be a vector that majorizes P, and g
′ be the generalized symmetric rank function
g′(S) = φ(P˜(S)). Then the max-min fair capacity associated to P is the same as the max-min fair capacity
associated with P˜, and he max-min fair point in P(g) is majorized by the max-min fair point in P(g′).
Corollary 17. Let r∗(P, n) be max-min fair in a Gaussian MAC with power constraints P1 ≤ . . . ≤ PK
and noise power n. If P  P′, then r∗(P, n)  r∗(P′, n).
4.3 Algorithm
We present a general recursive algorithm that computes the fair solution in Gaussian MAC. It is a variation
of the algorithm in [16, p.527], which computes the max-min fair rate vector in flow control problem. The
algorithm to be described below exploits the submodular property, and has shorter running time. The
basic idea is contained in the next proposition.
Proposition 18. Let g be a function mapping 2Ω to R+, and let S0 be a subset of Ω that achieves the
minimum
min
∅6=S⊆Ω
g(S)/|S|.
Let r∗ denote the the max-min or proportional fair point (they are the same by Corollary 12) in P(g), we
have r∗i ≥ g(S0)/|S0| for all i, with equality when i ∈ S0.
Proof. For each i, i is contained in a bottleneck Bi of r
∗, so that ri ≥ rj for all j ∈ Bi. So ri must be
larger than or equal to the average r∗(Bi)/|Bi|, and thereby
r∗i ≥
1
|Bi|
∑
j∈Bi
rj = g(Bi)/|Bi| ≥ g(S0)/|S0|.
Therefore r∗i ≥ g(S0)/|S0| for all i. Summing over all i ∈ S0, we obtain
r∗(S0) ≥ g(S0).
We must have equality in all the above inequalities. In particular, r∗i = g(S0)/|S0| for all i ∈ S0. The set
S0 is in fact a bottleneck of r
∗.
This motivates the max-min algorithm.
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Max-min algorithm The algorithm starts by first obtaining the subset S0 ∈ Ω described in Proposi-
tion 18, and set the rate of users in S0 to g(S0)/|S0|. The rate of other users are computed by recursively
applying the above computation to Ω′ := Ω \ S0 with
g′(S) := g(S ∪ S0)− g(S0) (5)
for S ⊆ Ω′.
Remark: It is noted that we only need the submodular property in proving the correctness of the
max-min algorithm. The function g need not satisfy the monotonic property or g(∅) = 0. We will use the
following lemma in proving the correctness of the algorithm. Note that the lemma holds in general for
arbitrary g.
Lemma 19. Let g be a function from 2Ω to R+, and S0 ⊆ Ω be chosen such that
g(S0)/|S0| = min
∅6=S⊆Ω
g(S)/|S|.
Define the function
g′(S) := g(S ∪ S0)− g(S0)
for S ⊆ Ω′ := Ω \ S0.
1. (Non-negativity) g′ ≥ 0, for all S ⊆ Ω′.
2. (Extension of bottleneck) Let r be a vector in P(g) such that r(S0) = g(S0). Let r′ be the restriction
of the vector r on Ω′. If B′ is a bottleneck of r′ in P(g′), then B′ ∪ S0 is a bottleneck of r in P(g).
3. (Preservation of order property) If g satisfies the order property, so does g′.
Proof. (1) By construction, we have
g(S ∪ S0) ≥ g(S0)
|S ∪ S0|
|S0|
.
Hence g(S ∪ S0) ≥ g(S0).
(2) r′(B′) equals g′(B′), which is g(B′ ∪ S0)− g(S0) by definition. Therefore
g(B′ ∪ S0) = r
′(B′) + g(S0)
= r(B′) + r(S0)
= r(B′ ∪ S0),
and B′ ∪ A is a bottleneck of r in P(g).
(3) Let S, T and U be subsets of Ω \ S0 so that |S| = |T | and S ∩ U = ∅ = T ∩ U . If g
′(S) ≤ g′(T ),
then
g′(S ∪ U) = g(S ∪ U ∪A)− g(A)
≤ g(T ∪ U ∪ A)− g(A)
= g′(T ∪ U).
Theorem 20. Suppose g : 2Ω → R+ satisfies the submodular property. In the polyhedron P(g), the result
obtained by the max-min algorithm is the max-min fair vector.
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Proof. Let r be the vector returned by the max-min algorithm, and let S0 be a subset of Ω such that
g(S0)/|S0| = min∅6=S⊆Ω g(S)/|S|. If S0 = Ω, then the components in r are constant and equal g(S0)/|S0|.
It belongs to P(g) because for any S ⊆ Ω
r(S) = |S|
g(S0)
|S0|
≤ g(S). (6)
It is easy to see that r is max-min fair.
Otherwise, if S0 ( Ω, then we have to apply the algorithm recursively. In this case, the vector r
satisfies the following properties: (i) ri = g(S0)/|S0| for all i ∈ S0 and (ii) the components of r with index
in Ω \ S0 yield the max-min solution to the polymatroid M′ on Ω \ S0 with rank function g′ defined as
in (5). It is easy to check that g′ also satisfies the submodular property. We first verify that r is in P(g).
For any subset A ⊆ Ω, we can write A as A1 ∪A2 with A1 ⊆ S0 and A2 ∩ S0 = ∅. We decompose r(A) as
r(A) = r(A1) + r(A2)
≤ |A1|
g(S0)
|S0|
+ g(A2 ∪ S0)− g(S0)
≤ g(A1) + g(A2 ∪ S0)− g(S0)
In the last inequality, we have used the defining property of S0, i.e., |A1|g(S0)/|S0| ≤ g(A1). By the
submodularity of g, we have
g(S0) + g(A1 ∪ A2) ≥ g(A1) + g(A2 ∪ S0).
Therefore r(A) ≤ g(A1 ∪ A2), and thus r is in P(g).
We now show that for each i = 1, . . . ,K, i is in some bottleneck Ai such that ri = max{rj : j ∈ Ai}.
We will apply Lemma 9 and conclude that r is the max-min vector in P(g). For i ∈ S0, we can take S0
as the required bottleneck Ai. For i 6∈ S0, i is an element of some bottleneck B′ in the polyhedron P(g′)
such that ri ≥ rj for all j ∈ B′. By part (2) in the previous lemma, B′ ∪ S0 is a bottleneck of P(g′). By
Prop. 18, we can show that ri ≥ rj for all j ∈ S0. Indeed,
ri ≥
g′(B′)
|B′|
=
1
|B′|
(g(B′ ∪ S0)− g(S0))
≥
1
|B′|
(
g(S0)
|S0 ∪B′|
|S0|
− g(S0)
)
=
g(S0)
|S0|
= rj .
Therefore i is in the bottleneck S0∪B′ and ri ≥ rj for all j ∈ B′∪S0. The vector r is thereby max-min
fair by Lemma 9
Example 1 (continued) We compute the max-min fair vector in Example 1. The minimum
min
∅6=S⊆Ω
g(S)/|S|
is achieved when S = {a}. We set rMM1 = g({a}) = 1. Next define
g′(S) := g({a} ∪ S)− g({a})
for S ⊆ {b, c}. Now g′({b}) = 2 and g′({c}) = 3 = g′({b, c}). So in this recursive step, we have the
minimum
g′({b, c})/2 = 3/2.
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The resulting max-min fair solution is
rMM = (1, 3/2, 3/2).
In the max-min algorithm, if we compute the minimum of g(S)/|S|, ∅ 6= S ⊆ Ω, in a straightforward
manner by comparing 2K − 1 numbers, the complexity of the algorithm is exponential in the number of
users. A more efficient implementation was described in [7] if g is a rank function. However, when the
function g satisfies the order property, we have a much faster algorithm.
Proposition 21. If the function g satisfies the order property and the submodular property, then the
max-min fair point in P(g) can be computed in O(K2) time.
Proof. In the max-min algorithm, instead of finding the minimum
min
∅6=S⊆Ω
g(S)/|S|
over all subsets of Ω, we sort g({1}), g({2}), . . . , g({K}) in nondecreasing order. This can be done in
O(K log(K)) time. For notational convenience, we relabel the users so that
g({1}) ≤ g({2}) ≤ . . . ≤ g({K}).
Since function g satisfies the order property, for any k, the minimum
min{g(S)/k : S ⊆ Ω, |S| = k}
is achieved by {1, 2, . . . , k} by Lemma 5. Instead of comparing g(S)/|S| over all subsets S of Ω, it is
sufficient to examine g({1, . . . , k})/k, for k = 1, . . . ,K. The minimum can be found in O(K) time. In the
next recursion, the function g′(S) = g(S ∪ S0)− g(S0) also satisfies the order property, and
g′({k0 + 1}) ≤ g
′({k0 + 2}) ≤ . . . ≤ g
′({K}).
The recursion can continue without any further sorting. There are at most K recursive steps and each
step takes O(K) time. The total complexity is therefore O(K2).
Example 2 Consider a scalar Gaussian MAC with 4 users. Their power constraints are 2, 8, 200, and
300. We let P be the vector (2, 8, 200, 300). The noise power at the receiver is equal to 1. Let
g1(S) := 0.5 log(1 +P(S))
for S ⊆ Ω. Here we use the natural logarithm function. We want to find the max-min fair rate allocation
or the proportional fair rate allocation in P(g1). The function g1 is a rank function and satisfies the order
property.
We first compute the minimum of g1({1}, g1({1, 2})/2, g1({1, 2, 3})/3 and g1({1, 2, 3, 4})/4. The min-
imum is g1({1}) = 0.5493. We set r
MM
1 = 0.5493.
In the next recursive step, set
g2(S) := g1(S ∪ {1})− g1({1})
for S ⊆ {2, 3, 4}. The minimum of g2({2}), g2({2, 3})/2 and g3({2, 3, 4})/3 is g2({2}). We set rMM2 =
g2({2}) = 0.6496.
Let
g3(S) := g2(S ∪ {2})− g2({2}) = g1(S ∪ {1, 2})− g1({1, 2})
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for S ⊆ {3, 4}, and compute the minimum of g3({3}) and g3({3, 4})/2. The minimum is g3({3, 4})2 =
0.9596, and we assign 0.9596 to both rMM3 and r
MM
4 .
The max-min fair rate allocation is thus
rMM = (0.5493, 0.6496, 0.9596, 0.9596).
The computation of the Nash bargaining solution in P(g) with disagreement point d amounts to finding
the max-min fair solution in P(g′), where
g′(S) = g(S)− d(S).
It is noted that if g is a rank function, the translated g′ in general does not satisfy the monotonic property.
However, the max-min algorithm works without assuming the monotonic property. We can apply the
max-min algorithm to find the Nash bargaining solution for any disagreement point.
We conclude this section by presenting an algorithm for computing Nash bargaining solution when the
rank function is generalized symmetric.
Lemma 22. Let g be a generalized symmetric rank function on Ω,
g(S) = φ(P(S)),
for S ⊆ Ω, and P is a vector in RK+ such that.
P1 ≤ P2 ≤ . . . ≤ PK .
Then for any k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, the minimum
min
{
g(S) +
∑
i∈S
g(Ω \ {i}) : S ⊆ Ω, |S| = k
}
is equal to
g({1, 2, . . . , k}) +
k∑
i=1
g(Ω \ {i}).
Proof. Let P¯i denote
∑K
j 6=i Pj , where the summation is over all indices except i. The lemma claims that
φ(P({1, . . . , k}) +
∑k
i=1 φ(P¯i), is the minimum. By Lemma 1, it suffices to show that
(P¯1, P¯2, . . . , P¯k, P1 + . . .+ Pk)
is majorized by
(P¯i1 , P¯i2 , . . . , P¯ik , Pi1 + . . .+ Pik)
for any choice of i1, . . . , ik, 1 ≤ i1 < . . . < ik ≤ K.
By subtracting
∑K
i=1 Pi from both vectors, we only need to show that
(P1, P2, . . . , Pk, Pk+1 + . . .+ PK) 
(
Pi1 , Pi1 , . . . , Pik ,
∑
j 6∈B
Pj
)
.
where B denote the set {i1, . . . , ik}.
Let Q be the vector
(
Pi1 , Pi1 , . . . , Pik ,
∑
j 6∈B Pj
)
, and Q[1], Q[2], . . . , Q[K] be the components of Q in
nondecreasing order. It is easy to see that
k∑
i=1
Pi ≤ Q[k].
Therefore (P1, P2, . . . , Pk, Pk+1 + . . .+ PK) majorizes Q. This finishes the proof of the lemma.
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Proposition 23. For a generalized symmetric rank function g, the Nash bargaining solution in P(g) with
the canonical disagreement point can be computed in O(K2) time.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that the power constraints are arranged in nondecreasing order.
Let d∗ denote the canonical disagreement point, i.e., for i = 1, . . . ,K, d∗i := g(Ω)− g(Ω \ {i}). Let
h(S) := g(S)− d∗(S) = g(S) +
∑
i∈S
g(Ω \ {i})− |S|g(Ω).
We relabel the users so that h({1}) ≤ . . . ≤ h({K}). By the previous lemma, the minimum
min
{
h(S) : S ⊆ Ω, |S| = k
}
is h({1, . . . , k}). Therefore,
min
∅6=S⊆Ω
h(S)/|S| = min
k=1,...,K
h({1, . . . , k})/k.
The minimum can be obtained efficiently after sorting h({1}), . . . , h({K}). Suppose that the minimum is
h({1, . . . , i0})/|i0|. We set rMMi to h({1, . . . , i0})/|i0|+ d
∗
i for i = 1, . . . , i0.
We next show that the same procedure can be repeated in the next recursive step. Let S0 = {1, . . . , i0},
and g′(S) = g(S∪S0)−g(S0) for S ⊆ Ω
′ := {i0+1, . . . ,K}. It is easy to see that g
′ is generalized symmetric.
Also, we can verify that (d∗i0+1, . . . , d
∗
K) is the canonical disagreement point for g
′. Indeed,
d∗i = g(Ω)− g(Ω \ {i})
= g′(Ω′)− g′(Ω′ \ {i})
for all i 6∈ S0.
Each recursive step takes O(K)). As there are at most K steps, the complexity for computing the
Nash bargaining solution with the canonical disagreement point is O(K2).
Example 2 (cont’d) We compute the Nash bargaining solution in the MAC as in Example 2, with the
canonical disagreement point d∗.
d∗1 = g1({1, 2, 3, 4})− g1({2, 3, 4}) = 0.0020
d∗2 = g1({1, 2, 3, 4})− g1({1, 3, 4}) = 0.0079
d∗3 = g1({1, 2, 3, 4})− g1({1, 2, 4}) = 0.2483
d∗4 = g1({1, 2, 3, 4})− g1({1, 2, 3}) = 0.4423
The minimum of (
g1({1, . . . , k})− d
∗
1 − . . .− d
∗
k
)
/k
for k = 1, 2, 3, 4, is g1({1})− d∗1. Therefore,
rMM1 = (g1({1})− d
∗
1) + d
∗
1 = 0.5493.
For S ⊆ {2, 3, 4}, let g2(S) := g1(S ∪ {1})− g1({1}).
g2({2})− d
∗
2 = 0.6418
g2({2, 3})− d∗2 − d
∗
3
2
= 0.9352
g2({2, 3, 4})− d∗2 − d
∗
3 − d
∗
4
3
= 0.6235
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The last equation yields the bottleneck. We set
rMM2 = 0.6235 + d
∗
2 = 0.6314
rMM3 = 0.6235 + d
∗
3 = 0.8718
rMM4 = 0.6235 + d
∗
4 = 1.0657
The resulting Nash bargaining solution is
(0.5493, 0.6314, 0.8718, 1.0657).
5 Broadcast Channels
In a K-user Gaussian broadcast channel, the received signal of the ith user is
Yi = X + Zi
where X is a zero-mean Gaussian random variable with variance PT and Zi is the noise at the ith
receiver, which is modeled as a Gaussian variable with mean zero and variance Ni. We will assume that
N1 ≤ N2 ≤ . . . ≤ NK throughout this section. Every point r on the boundary of the capacity region
satisfies
ri =
1
2
log
(
1 +
αiPT
Ni +
∑i−1
j=1 αjPT
)
for some α1, . . . , αK such that
K∑
j=1
αj = 1, αj ≥ 0.
5.1 Symmetric Capacity
In order to obtain the symmetric capacity in a BC, we solve a related problem of finding the power
distribution so that the users have a common SINR γ, i.e.,
γ =
p1
N1
=
p2
N2 + p1
= · · · =
pK
NK + pK−1 + . . .+ p1
.
The noise vector N can be expressed in terms of the power vector p by a matrix multiplication


N1
N2
...
NK

 =


1/γ 0 · · · 0
−1 1/γ · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
−1 −1 −1 1/γ




p1
p2
...
pK

 .
Let Gγ denote the lower triangular matrix in the above equation. The diagonal elements of Gγ all equal
1/γ, and the elements below the diagonal are all −1. The following lemma is obtained by straightforward
calculation.
Lemma 24. The inverse of Gγ is a non-negative matrix. The (i, j)-entry of G
−1
γ is
[G−1γ ]ij =


0 if i < j,
γ if i = j,
γ2(1 + γ)i−j−1 otherwise.
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Hence, given the noise powersN = (N1, . . . , NK) and the SINR requirement γ, we get the corresponding
power allocation by multiplying G−1γ by N. The following theorem is an immediate consequence. It says
that in a Gaussian BC, users with lower noise power uses less power.
Theorem 25. In a Gaussian BC with noise powers N1 ≤ . . . ≤ NK, the powers corresponding to the
symmetric rate allocation are in increasing order,
psym1 ≤ p
sym
2 ≤ . . . ≤ p
sym
K .
Proof. Let p be the power vector so that all users have SINR γ, and let hij be the (i, j)-entry of G
−1
γ .
The power of user i can be obtained by
pi = hi1N1 + . . .+ hiiNi.
Since the first term is nonnegative, we can remove the first term and get
pi ≥ hi2N2 + hi3N3 + . . .+ hiiNi.
It is clear from the previous lemma that hij depends only on i− j, hence
pi ≥ h(i−1)1N2 + h(i−1)2N3 + . . .+ h(i−1)(i−1)Ni
We now use the assumption N1 ≤ . . . ≤ NK to obtain
pi ≥ h(i−1)1N1 + h(i−1)2N2 + . . .+ h(i−1)(i−1)Ni−1
= pi−1.
Consequently p1 ≤ p2 ≤ . . . ≤ pK .
We denote the required total power by φ(N, γ), which can be computed by
φ(N, γ) = [1, . . . , 1] ·G−1γ N
= N1θ1(γ) +N2θ2(γ) + . . .+NKθK(γ)
where θj(γ) denote the sum of elements in the jth column of G
−1
γ . It is noted that the function θj(γ) is a
convex function of γ for all j. Furthermore, we have
θ1(γ) ≥ θ2(γ) ≥ . . . ≥ θK(γ). (7)
Given a noise vector N, the function φ is a convex and monotonically increasing function of γ.
The next theorem compares the symmetric capacity of two broadcast channels with the same total
power constraint.
Theorem 26. If N  N′, then Csym(N, PT ) ≤ Csym(N′, PT ). In other words, Csym(·, PT ) is a Schur-
convex function.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that the components of N1 and N2 are sorted in nondecreasing
order. For a given total power constraint and noise vector N, we can obtain the SINR by solving the
equation
φ(N, γ) = PT .
The proof is complete if we can show that φ(N, γ) ≥ φ(N′, γ) for all γ, i.e., φ(·, γ) is Schur-concave for
all γ (Fig. 3). Indeed, for i > j, we have Ni ≥ Nj and
∂φ
∂Ni
−
∂φ
∂Nj
= θi(γ)− θj(γ) ≤ 0.
by (7). Therefore φ(·, γ) is Schur-concave by Schur’s criterion.
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Figure 3: The total power required for symmetric rate allocation as a function of SINR. The noise vector
associated to the lower curve majorizes the noise vector associated to the upper one. The dash lines show
how to find the SINR when the total power is given.
Theorem 27. For fixed noise powers, the symmetric capacity is a convex function of the total power.
Proof. For a fixed noise vector N, the function φ(N, γ) is a convex function of γ. Hence the inverse
function φ−1 is a concave function.
Algorithm We have a numerical algorithm computing the symmetric capacity in Gaussian BC by means
of the function φ(N, γ). For a given total power PT , we search for the value of γ so that φ(N, γ) = PT .
This can be done easily as φ is a monotonic function of γ. We then compute the data rate from γ.
Corollary 28. The infimum of ηsym, taken over all K-user Gaussian BC, is zero.
Proof. The sum capacity is attained if we allocate all power to user 1,
Csum =
1
2
log
(
1 +
PT
N1
)
.
Suppose the noise power of user K, NK , is increased, while the others are fixed, the value of the function
φ(N, γ) is increased for all γ. Then the symmetric capacity is decreased, but the sum capacity remains
constant. By taking NK approaching infinity, ηsym approaches zero.
5.2 Proportional Fair Capacity
The capacity region written in the following form is useful for computing the proportional fair allocation:
ri =
1
2
log
( Ni + xiPT
Ni + xi−1PT
)
for i = 1, . . . ,K, (8)
with
0 = x0 ≤ x1 ≤ x2 ≤ . . . ≤ xK−1 ≤ xK = 1.
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The quantity xiPT represents the sum of powers P1 + . . .+ Pi.
Theorem 29. Let Φi be a concave and monotonically increasing function for i = 1, . . . ,K. Using the
notation in (8), the point that maximizes
f(r) :=
K∑
i=1
Φi(ri)
in the capacity region of a BC with total power PT and noise powers N1 ≤ . . . ≤ NK satisfies
Φ′i(ri)
Ni + xiPT
=
Φ′i+1(ri+1)
Ni+1 + xiPT
(9)
for i = 1, . . . ,K − 1.
In particular a proportional fair allocation satisfies the equation
ri(Ni + xiPT ) = ri+1(Ni+1 + xiPT ) (10)
for i = 1, . . . ,K − 1.
Proof. Suppose that
r =
(1
2
log
( Ni + xiPT
Ni + xi−1PT
))
i=1,...,K
(11)
maximizes f(r). This point lies on the boundary of the capacity region. The tangent plane at r must be
orthogonal to the gradient
∇f(r) =
(
Φ′1(r1),Φ
′
2(r2), . . . ,Φ
′
K(rk)
)
i.e., it must be orthogonal to r′ − r for all r′ on the tangent plane.
Differentiate (11) with respect to xi, we obtain for i = 1, . . . ,K − 1,
1
2
(
0, . . . , 0,
PT
Ni + xiPT
,
−PT
Ni+1 + xiPT
, 0, . . . , 0
)
.
The two fractions in the above vector is in the ith and (i + 1)st component. This must be orthogonal to
the gradient ∇f(r). Equating the dot product to zero, we get
1
2
PT
Ni + xiPT
Φ′i(ri)−
1
2
PT
Ni+1 + xiPT
Φ′i+1(ri+1) = 0
For the proportional fair point, we take Φi to be the log function for all i.
Corollary 30. Let rPF and γPF be the rate vector and SINR vector corresponding to the proportional
fair allocation, with N1 ≤ . . . ≤ NK. Then the rates and SINR of the users are in decreasing order, i.e.,
rPF1 ≥ r
PF
2 ≥ . . . ≥ r
PF
K
and
γPF1 ≥ γ
PF
2 ≥ . . . ≥ γ
PF
K .
Proof. From (10), we have
ri = ri+1
Ni+1 + xiPT
Ni + xiPT
≥ ri+1.
Since the rate is a monotonically increasing function of the SINR, the inequalities about SINR follows
immediately.
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Corollary 31. The infimum of ηPF , taken over all K-user Gaussian BC, is equal to the lower bound
1/K.
Proof. Suppose that we fix the noise powers N1, . . . , NK and take PT → 0. Equation (10) implies that
rPFi Ni ≈ r
PF
j Nj
for all i and j. When PT is small,
rPFi =
1
2
log
(
1 +
pPFi
Ni + pPFi−1 + . . . p
PF
1
)
≈
1
2
pPFi
Ni
.
Hence pPFi ≈ p
PF
j for all i and j, and p
PF
i → PT /K at the proportional fair allocation as PT → 0. We
have the following limits,
Csum →
1
2
PT
N1
,
and
CPF →
1
2
K∑
i=1
pPFi
Ni
≈
PT
2K
K∑
i=1
1
Ni
.
We obtain
ηPF =
CPF
Csum
→
1
K
(
1 +
N1
N2
+ . . .+
N1
NK
)
.
The right hand side can be arbitrarily close to 1/K if N1 ≪ Ni for all i = 2, 3 . . . ,K.
Theorem 32. In a Gaussian BC with noise power N1 ≤ . . . ≤ NK, the corresponding powers correspond-
ing to the proportional fair allocation are in increasing order,
pPF1 < p
PF
2 < . . . < p
PF
K .
Proof. We first prove the theorem in a two-user case. The noise power of user i is Ni, (i = 1, 2) with
N1 ≤ N2. By Theorem 29, the proportional fair rate allocation is
r1 =
1
2
log
(N1 + αPT
N1
)
r2 =
1
2
log
( N2 + PT
N2 + αPT
)
,
where α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 is chosen such that
r1(N1 + αPT ) = r2(N2 + αPT ).
That is, the value of α satisfies
(N1 + αPT ) log
(
N1 + αPT
N1
)
= (N2 + αPT ) log
(
N2 + PT
N2 + αPT
)
(12)
The power of user 1 is αPT and the power of user 2 is (1−α)PT . We want to show that (12) cannot hold
if α ≥ 0.5.
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We will apply the inequality
x log
(
1 +
b
x
)
< b
which holds for x > max{0,−b}. This inequality is an immediate consequence of the inequality
ex < 1 + x, ∀x 6= 0.
Applying the inequality, we get an upper bound
R.H.S. of (12) = (N2 + αPT ) log
(
1 +
(1− α)PT
N2 + αPT
)
< (1− α)PT ,
and a lower bound
L.H.S. of (12) = −(N1 + αPT ) log
(
1 +
−αPT
N1 + αPT
)
> −(−αPT ) = αPT .
If α ≥ 0.5, we can combine the two bounds above,
(N1 + αPT ) log
(
N1 + αPT
N1
)
> αPT ≥ (1− α)PT
> (N2 + αPT ) log
(
N2 + PT
N2 + αPT
)
.
Therefore, we must have strict inequality in (12) when α ≥ 0.5. It is noted that the bounds in the above
argument is valid for any N1 and N2.
In a Gaussian BC with K users, consider the pair of consecutive users i and i+1. At the proportional
fair point in the capacity region,
(
Ni +
i∑
j=1
Pi
)
log
(
1 +
Pi
Ni +
∑i−1
j=1 Pj
)
=
(
Ni+1 +
i∑
j=1
Pi
)
log
(
1 +
Pi+1
Ni+1 +
∑i
j=1 Pj
)
by Theorem 29. By setting
N˜1 := Ni +
i−1∑
j=1
Pi
N˜2 := Ni+1 +
i−1∑
j=1
Pi
P˜T := Pi + Pi+1
α˜ := Pi/(Pi + Pi+1),
we get
(N˜1 + α˜P˜T ) log
(
N˜1 + α˜P˜T
N˜1
)
= (N˜2 + α˜P˜T ) log
(
N˜2 + P˜T
N˜2 + α˜P˜T
)
.
We can proceed as in the 2-user case and conclude that pi < pi+1.
From numerical examples, we have the following conjecture.
Conjecture 33. Let CPF (N, PT ) denote the proportional fair capacity of a Gaussian BC with noise vector
N and total power PT . If N  N′, then CPF (N, PT ) ≤ CPF (N′, PT )
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5.3 Algorithm
We will use the notation for the capacity region in (8), and present an numerical algorithm that maximizes∑K
i=1Φi(ri) in the capacity region of a Gaussian BC. It is assumed that Φi is a strictly monotonically
increasing and concave function, so that the inverse of the derivative Φ′i is easy to compute. If Φi is the
logarithm function, then the resulting point is the proportional fair solution. If Φi(x) = log(x − di), the
result is the Nash bargaining solution with disagreement point d.
Theorem 29 says that the equation
Φ′i+1(ri+1) = Φ
′
i(ri)
Ni+1 + xiPT
Ni + xiPT
must holds for the optimal solution. We use this equation to express xi+1 in terms of xi for i = 2, . . . ,K−1.
It reduces the problem to a one dimensional search. Given any x1 we first compute r2 by
r2 = Φ
′−1
2
(
Φ′1(r1)
N2 + x1PT
N1 + x1PT
)
and get x2 by solving
r2 =
1
2
log
(N2 + x2PT
N2 + x1PT
)
In similar way, we compute ri and xi for i = 3, 4, . . . ,K − 1. Finally rK can be obtained once we know
xK−1.
Define the function χ(x1) as
χ(x1) := Φ
′
K(rK)(NK−1 + xK−1PT )− Φ
′
K−1(rK−1)(NK + xK−1PT )
It is a function of x1 as the variable rK , rK−1, xK and xK−1 all depend on x1. We can now search for
the zero of χ(x1) numerically, say χ(x
∗
1) = 0. From x
∗
1, we get x
∗
i by method described above. The vector
(x∗1, . . . , x
∗
K) will satisfy the condition in Theorem 29 and hence is the optimal solution. Since any zeros
of χ gives rise to an optimal solution and we know that there the optimal solution is unique, the function
χ has only one zero.
6 Conclusion
We show how to pick a point in the capacity region of Gaussian MAC and BC according to some fairness
criteria. In the Gaussian MAC, there is a strong notion of fairness, namely there is a point on the dominant
face that are majorized by all other points on the dominant face, and are both max-min and proportional
fair. We can thus call this the fair point in the capacity region. In some particular cases, the fair point can
be computed in O(K2) time. For the Gaussian BC, the problem of locating the proportional fair solution
or Nash bargaining solution reduces to a one-dimensional search. In both channels, fair rate allocation
can be compute efficiently.
7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 9. (⇐) For any i ∈ Ω, suppose that i is contained in a bottleneck B, and ri = max{rj :
j ∈ B}. If we want to increase ri, we have to decrease rk for some other k ∈ B. Since ri is the largest in
{rj : j ∈ B}, we must have rk ≤ ri. The vector r is thus max-min fair.
(⇒) Conversely, suppose that r is a vector such that B1, . . . , BT are all the bottlenecks that contain
i, and ri is not maximal in all such bottlenecks, i.e., ri < max{rj : j ∈ Bt} for all t = 1, . . . , T . We can
choose it in Bt such that rit > ri. If we increase ri by ǫ and decrease each rit by sufficiently small ǫ, the
resulting vector remains in P(g). The vector r is thereby not max-min fair.
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Lemma 34. Suppose that a function g : 2Ω → R+ satisfies the submodular property. Union and intersec-
tion of two bottlenecks of r in P(g) are also bottlenecks of r.
Proof. Suppose that S and T are both bottlenecks of r, i.e., r(S) = g(S) and r(T ) = g(S).
r(S) + r(T ) = g(S) + g(T )
≥ g(S ∪ T ) + g(S ∩ T )
≥ r(S ∪ T ) + r(S ∩ T )
= r(S) + r(T )
Therefore, all inequalities above are in fact equalities. In particular, r(S ∪ T ) = g(S ∪ T ) and r(S ∩ T ) =
g(S ∩ T ).
The proof of Theorem 10 is divided into the next two propositions.
Proposition 35. Suppose that rMM be the max-min fair point in P(g), where g satisfies the order property.
By relabeling, we can assume without loss of generality that
rMM1 = . . . = r
MM
i1
< rMMi1+1 = . . . = r
MM
i2
< . . . < rMMiL−1+1 = . . . = r
MM
iL
, (13)
where
0 < i1 < i2 < . . . < iL = K.
The sets {1, . . . , iℓ}, ℓ = 1, . . . , L, are bottlenecks of rMM . In particular, we have
rMM (Ω) = g(Ω),
i.e., the max-min fair solution lies on the dominant face of P(g).
Proof. Let Bℓ denote the set {1, . . . , iℓ} for ℓ = 1, . . . , L.
For any element j ∈ B1, there is a bottleneck Aj so that rj = max{ri : i ∈ Aj}. If j ∈ B1 and k 6∈ B1,
then rMMj < r
MM
k . Hence Aj must be a subset of B1, for all j ∈ B1. By taking the union of Aj over all
j ∈ B1, we get
B1 =
⋃
j∈B1
Aj ,
and we can conclude that B1 is also a bottleneck of r
MM by Lemma 34.
By similar argument, we can show that Bℓ is bottleneck of r
MM for all ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , L}.
Proposition 36. For ℓ = 1, . . . , L, let Bℓ be the set {1, 2, . . . , iℓ}, with 0 < i1 < i2 < . . . < iL = K. Let
w be a vector in RK+ such that
w1 = . . . = wi1 < wi1+1 = . . . = wi2 < . . . < wiL−1+1 = . . . = wiL
All vectors in the region
R := {r ∈ RK+ : r(Bℓ) ≤ w(Bℓ), ℓ = 1, . . . , L}
satisfy
k∑
j=1
r[j] ≤
k∑
j=1
wj
for k = 1, . . . ,K. Consequently, w is majorized by all points in R such that r(Ω) = w(Ω)
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Proof. Suppose that v is a point in R that does not majorize w. There is an index k, 1 ≤ k < K, such
that
k∑
i=1
v[i] >
k∑
i=1
wi.
We can find an ℓ so that iℓ ≤ k < iℓ+1. (Define i0 := 0 and B0 := ∅ if necessary.)
Consider the collection T of all subsets S ⊆ Ω such that Bℓ ⊆ S ⊆ Bℓ+1 and |S| = k. The number of
such subsets is
a :=
(
iℓ+1 − iℓ
k − iℓ
)
.
Since wi is constant for i ∈ Bℓ+1 \Bℓ, we have
∑
i∈S
wi =
k∑
i=1
wi
for all S ∈ T . Hence ∑
i∈S
vi ≥
k∑
i=1
v[i] >
k∑
i=1
wi =
∑
i∈S
wi.
We sum the above over all S ∈ T , ∑
S∈T
∑
i∈S
vi >
∑
S∈T
∑
i∈S
wi. (14)
The left hand side in the above inequality equals
a
iℓ∑
i=1
vi + b
iℓ+1∑
i=iℓ+1
vi,
where
b :=
a(k − iℓ)
iℓ+1 − iℓ
.
Similarly, the right hand side of (14) equals
a
iℓ∑
i=1
wi + b
iℓ+1∑
i=iℓ+1
wi.
We rewrite (14) as
(a− b)
iℓ∑
i=1
(vi − wi) + b
iℓ+1∑
i=1
(vi − wi) > 0,
or equivalently
(a− b)(v(Bℓ)−w(Bℓ)) + b(v(Bℓ+1)−w(Bℓ+1)) > 0.
Since a ≥ b, w(Bℓ) ≥ v(Bℓ) and w(Bℓ+1) ≥ v(Bℓ+1), the left hand side must be less than or equal to
zero. We get a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 16. Suppose without loss of generality that P1 ≤ . . . ≤ PK and P˜1 ≤ . . . ≤ P˜K . Let r∗
and r˜∗ be the max-min fair point in P(g) and P(g′) respectively. It is clear that g({1}) ≤ . . . ≤ g({K}),
g′({1}) ≤ . . . ≤ g′({K}), and both g and g′ satisfy the order property. By Theorem 15, we obtain
r∗1 ≤ . . . ≤ r
∗
K and r˜
∗
1 ≤ . . . ≤ r˜
∗
K . We want to show
k∑
j=1
r∗j ≥
k∑
j=1
r˜∗j
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for k = 1, . . . ,K − 1.
As in the proof of Prop. 35, a bottleneck of the max-min fair vector is of the form {1, 2, . . . ℓ}. We can
disregard all constraints except those in the form r(S) ≤ g(S) for S = {1, 2, . . . , ℓ}, ℓ = 1, . . . ,K. Let k
be any integer between 1 and K. By Prop. 36, the point r∗ maximizes
∑k
j=1 r
∗
j in the region

r1 + . . .+ rk ≤ g({1, 2, . . . , k}) for k = 1, . . . ,K,
rk ≤ rk+1 for k = 1, . . . ,K − 1,
rk ≥ 0 for k = 1, . . . ,K.
Expressed in terms of matrix, the constraints become rTA ≤ bT , where
A =


1 1 1 · · · 1 1 · · ·
1 1 · · · 1 −1 1 · · ·
1 · · · 1 −1 · · ·
... · · · 1
1 · · · −1


and
bT = [g({1}), g({1, 2}), . . . , g({1, 2, . . . ,K}), 0, . . . , 0].
Let c denote the column vector [1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0]T in which exactly k components are equal to 1. The
maximal value in the linear program
max
k∑
j=1
rj = c
T · r,
rTA ≤ bT
r ≥ 0
is equal to
∑k
j=1 r
∗
j . By duality of linear programming, the minimal value of the dual problem, with sj ’s
as the dual variables,
min
K∑
j=1
g({1, . . . , j})sj,
As ≥ c
s ≥ 0
coincides with
∑k
j=1 r
∗
j .
Since P  P′, we know that g({1, . . . , j}) ≥ g′({1, . . . , j}) for j = 1, . . . ,K. If we replace g({1, . . . , j})
by g′({1, . . . , j}) , we obtain another linear program,
min
K∑
j=1
g′({1, . . . , j})sj,
As ≥ c
s ≥ 0.
The minimal value equals
∑k
j=1 r˜
∗
j . We are optimizing a smaller objective function over the same feasible
region. As a result, we must have
∑k
j=1 rj ≥
∑k
j=1 r˜
∗
j .
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